My first objection is that it is not proper to allow only one House, namely the Upper House to amend the Constitution which has got a sanctity of its own. There is the article 304 which lays down particular provisions with some definite kind of majority, for amendment of the Constitution. Of course it is desirable to have some elasticity. Therefore, I would not have minded if the continuance of the resolution had been secured by a vote of the State Legislatures concerned. As it is, borrowing the phraseology used in another context, I might say that if the resolution really reflects the opinion of the State legislatures it is useless. But if it does not reflect the opinion of the State legislatures it is mischievous. If it reflected the opinion of the State Legislature there was no difficulty at all in getting the item passed in the various State Legislatures. If, on the other hand, it did not reflect their opinion then of course we were going counter to the wishes of those who were responsible according to the Constitution for these subjects. I do admit that there might be a time when such a power to the Centre is required. Then, provide for a definite emergency like that. But in the absence of any emergency, to amend the Constitution by such a resolution is not proper. The Council of States’ resolution stands for one year. Why not make it renewable on this definite condition that before the expiry of that period a majority of the State Legislature should pass resolutions asking for the continuance of that resolution say for two years or three years? Thereafter, if the amendment is to continue, then it should be done by the usual manner laid down by article 304. In view of these fundamental objections of allowing only the Upper House without Parliament having any say and without the Legislature of the State having any say in the matter, I suggest it is worthwhile considering whether the article should he maintained in this form.
